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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

of New Jersey of any lands under water in front of his lands . . . . " The
State was the proprietor of all lands under tidelands and possesses all of the
incidents of ownership, including the absolute discretion in making
conveyances or granting licenses to its tidelands, subject to the governing
statutory criteria and the demands of the public trust doctrine. The Council
held the authority to exercise this discretion with the approval of the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Its
determinations were entitled to a presumption of validity.
The court found that the Council reviewed the factual evidence and
properly concluded that the inland lot owners were riparian owners within
the meaning of the statute. It accepted the position that the deeded rights to
the twenty-foot strip of riparian property gave the inland lot owners
sufficient indicia of riparian ownership, giving them the ability to apply for
a riparian lease. It further concluded that appellant's stated reasons for the
purpose of the right-of-way, for an underground drainage system, were
without any evidence.
The appellant also contended that the language in the deeds conveyed
an easement. An easement holds a right in land different from a fee or
leasehold interest, because it is a "use" interest and not a "possessory" one
in the land. However, the court looked to the intent of the parties as the
determinative element of what a deed conveys, not the labels used. The
court held that the Council properly concluded that the inland lot owners
had sufficient indicia of riparian ownership such as to justify the exercise
of its discretionary authority to issue the revocable license, and does not
reach the title considerations. The court, therefore, affirmed the Council's
grant of the tideland's license.
Melody Divine

NEW YORK
People v. Duell, 698 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (denying
defendant's request for bill of particulars, and claim of ineffective
counsel).
The Duells owned and operated an apartment building located in the
Town of Minerva, Essex County.
A tributary flowed through an
underground culvert on the Duells' property and connected with the
Minerva Stream, a stream environmentally protected for public recreation.
Over a five-year period, the Department of Environmental Conservation
discovered that Duells' sewage system discharged raw sewage onto the
surface of the Duells' property, close to the stream. The Duells were
convicted for failure to repair the sewage system or to acquire the proper
permit for discharging sewage into a state waterway. The Duells appealed
on two points, both of which the court found without merit.
First, the Duells alleged inadequacies in the People's response to their
demand for a bill of particulars.
The court held this contention
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unpersuasive because the Duells made their demand more than thirty days
after their arraignment and failed to offer a valid excuse. If the Duells
wanted to challenge their indictment as vague, they should have made a
timely demand for a bill of particulars. Since they failed to do this, the
court held that the People's indictment was appropriate and the Duells'
appeal on this issue was without merit.
Second, the Duells claimed they had ineffective counsel. They argued
that their counsel's trial strategy was ineffective and therefore, was
prejudicial to their case. The court held that absent proof that the Duells
were actually prejudiced by their counsel's trial technique, their claim of
ineffective counsel was without merit. Therefore, finding both claims
without merit, the court affirmed the lower court judgment.
Sheela S. Parameswar
Cammon v. City of New York, 700 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (holding New York Labor Law's strict liability provisions were not
preempted by federal maritime law and that New York State had the right
to continue regulating safe construction practices in its navigable waters
concurrently with the application of the federal maritime law).
The plaintiff, Willie Cammon ("Cammon"), received injuries while
engaged in renovation and reconstruction work at the Hunts Point
Sanitation Department Transfer Station in New York. While Cammon
worked on a raft secured to a land-based structure, a passing tugboat
created turbulence shifting a crane bar and float stage. This caused a
timber to swing into Cammon and injured him. Cammon brought an action
against New York City, who owned the Hunts Point Station, and the
general contractor Anjac Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendants"). The trial court
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to New York Labor
Law. In granting the motion, the trial court found that both New York
Labor Law causes of action were preempted by federal maritime
jurisdiction.
Cammon appealed the order granting the Defendant's motion to
dismiss to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. This court granted
review to decide whether federal maritime law preempted New York Labor
Law.
The court stated that a party seeking to invoke Federal admiralty
jurisdiction must satisfy conditions of both location and connection with
maritime activity. In this case, repairing a pier adjacent to a navigable
waterway constituted traditional maritime activity governed by the
principles of Federal maritime law. Neither party disputed that the
accident occurred in navigable waters, or that Cammon had coverage and
received benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation
Act ("LHWCA").
The court referred to precedent which held that state law could be
preempted if either Congress evidenced an intent to occupy a field or if

